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This paper studies the determinants of location choice by foreign investors in France using a
sample of almost 4000 foreign investments over 10 years and 92 locations. Concerning
agglomeration effects, we find very strong evidence of positive spillovers between firms, and
identify detailed patterns of clustering, assessing, for instance, the countries of origin and the
industries for which those spillovers are the most substantial. Concerning regional policies, we find
very little evidence of any positive impact. Finally, we identify a ‘learning process’ of FDI, the
location decisions becoming more remote from the country of origin during the period we study.
D 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Regional policies are largely used by local, national or European authorities in order to
try and influence the location of economic activity in favor of lagging regions. Public
authorities are particularly anxious to attract foreign investors, often thought to be a
source of productivity increases by local firms in addition to creating new jobs. Related to
these practices is the now well-documented finding that firms cluster in space (see
Henderson and Kuncoro, 1996; Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Mayer and Mucchielli,0166-0462/$ - see front matter D 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0166-0462(03)00010-3
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as that used here). The decision makers implementing promotion and regional policies
often have the idea in mind that being successful in attracting a first critical set of firms
will generate a virtuous mechanism of self-reinforcing agglomeration of firms in the
territory targeted.
This paper analyzes location choices of foreign investors in France. It is particularly
focused on the measurement of agglomeration effects—the positive influence of a firm’s
location choice on the probability that the subsequent firms make the same choice—and
the identification of the effect of regional policies used by public authorities to attract
firms.
The existing empirical literature on agglomeration effects has mainly consisted of
national-level studies (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Devereux and Griffith, 1998) or choices
of states in the USA (Carlton, 1983; Friedman et al., 1992; Head et al., 1995, 1999). The
preceding work on location choices in Europe at a lower geographical level than
countries has considered choices of regions by foreign investors in the European territory
(Ferrer, 1998). Mayer and Mucchielli (1999) considered, in an integrated way, the
national and regional choices of Japanese investors in Europe. Some papers have
considered location problems at a very thin geographical level for Brazil (Hansen,
1987), China (Head and Ries, 1996) and Indonesia (Henderson and Kuncoro, 1996).
However, to our knowledge, nobody has studied the determinants of location choice at a
very detailed level for a European country that would be a major receiver of FDI (see,
however, Guimara˜es et al., 2000, for a very thin analysis of location choice of FDI within
Portugal). This paper is the first to consider individual firms’ decisions for over 90
territorial units in France.
One of our objectives is to study in more detail the characteristics of agglomeration
effects. Due to a very large dataset, we are notably able to differentiate the determinants of
location depending on the country of origin of the investor and the industry of the plant
located in France. Our results give insights for the following questions that are likely to be
important for the policy maker: Does the nationality of the firms matter for agglomeration
effects? Do firms cluster more with other firms from the same country? Do firms show a
preference for regions within France that are near to their home market? Do all industries
exhibit the same pattern of geographic concentration? We show that the nationality of the
investor is important in location patterns. There are certain countries sharing a border with
France for which investors show a very strong tendency to locate near their country of
origin. However, this tendency is declining over time, which suggests some learning
process with respect to the difficulty of operating a plant abroad. We also observe very
different behavior depending on the industry. With respect to agglomeration effects, it is
shown that firms cluster with their competitors, but that this behavior depends on the
nationality of both the competitors and the investor.
We then analyze the effect of both French and European regional policies on location
choice. We show that foreign investors are, to a large extent, not sensitive to investment
incentives. Even when regional policies appear to have a statistically significant positive
effect, the magnitude of this effect is very low compared to other determinants.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical determinants
of location choice using a very simple oligopolistic competition model that yields an
M. Crozet et al. / Regional Science and Urban Economics 34 (2004) 27–54 29estimable equation for the location choice of firms. Section 3 describes the econometric
model and the data used. Section 4 presents results on general and industry level location
patterns, focusing on agglomeration effects. Section 5 presents results on the impact of
regional policies and Section 6 concludes.2. Theoretical foundations
Location choice determinants can be broadly classified into four large groups: demand
that can be expected on the chosen location, factor costs that would be faced, the number
of ‘local’ and foreign firms active in that same location and public policies designed to
attract firms.
The sign expected on the two first variables is very widely accepted to be respectively
positive and negative. The influence of the number of firms is more complicated and
results from a trade-off between agglomeration and dispersion forces. On the one hand, a
long strand of papers in location theory insists on the fact that geographic distance isolates
firms from competition. A rise in the number of firms in a given location shifts prices
down in that location and therefore reduces incentives to locate there. On the other hand,
positive externalities between firms can emerge from technological spillovers or other
mechanisms recently celebrated by the economic geography literature (Krugman, 1991;
Venables, 1996). The relative strengths of the two forces shape the extent of geographical
clustering of firms.
Investment promotion policies can take various forms: job creation subsidy, temporary
exemption from local taxes, low levels of corporate taxation, etc. Everything else equal,
firms should be positively influenced by this determinant in their choice.
All these determinants can be synthesized in a very simple formal framework,
yielding an estimable equation describing the profitability of choosing a particular
location. Suppose firms use quantity as their strategic variable and let demand take
a generalized Cobb–Douglas form where price and income elasticities can differ
from 1:
Q ¼ am
c
pb
; ð1Þ
where a is the share of income spent on the particular good considered, m is the
income (exogenous here) of consumers, b is price elasticity and c income elasticity,
and Q is total quantity demanded at price p, this demand being satisfied by locally
producing firms.1 Suppose that firms have identical production costs when producing
in the same location, ensuring the individual quantities will be equal in equilibrium:
Q ¼ Nq, N being the number of active firms on the market. The after-tax profit of
a representative firm willing to produce and sell at this location is p ¼ ð1 tÞ1 This assumption is, of course, not realistic as firms in each location usually serve consumers in several
locations. It is, however, only made for analytical clarity and our demand variable will take into account the fact
that firms serve several locations.
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sense) and c is a unit production cost function.
Using (1) and adding first-order conditions over the N firms, we obtain the following
expression for total equilibrium quantity:
Q ¼ Nq ¼ am
c
Nb
Nb  1
cb
 b
;
which gives equilibrium price p ¼ ½Nb=ðNb  1Þc . Substituting q and p in the profit
function, we obtain the following expression:
p ¼ ð1 tÞ am
c
N ðbþ1Þ
b
Nb  1 c
 1b" #
:
Supposing that price elasticity is superior to 1 (b > 1), profit is a decreasing function of
corporate tax rate, production costs and number of active firms, that is competition
intensity (a traditional effect in location theory; see d’Aspremont et al., 1979). Profit is also
an increasing function of consumers’ expenditure, i.e. of market size.
Let us specify a bit more the unit cost function such that unit cost is a function
of ongoing wage (w) and includes a positive externality related to the number of
firms:2
c ¼ whwNhN ; hw > 0; hN > 0:
The influence of the number of firms is then ambiguous. With a sufficiently large
number of firms, the profit function can be approximated by
p ¼ ð1 tÞamcðwhwÞ1bN ½hN ðb1Þ2: ð2Þ
Eq. (2) is log-linear and gives us the theoretical foundations of our empirical estimation
of location determinants. The signs of the first three variables are still clearly determined,
but the sign of the count of firms variable now depends on the importance of the
externality parameter relative to the negative impact of competition.3. Implementation of the location choice model
3.1. The econometric model
3.1.1. Conditional logit
The economic decision studied in theoretical location models is by nature a discrete
choice among several alternatives made by individual firms. Turning to empirical2 This externality takes a form comparable to that specified by Belleflamme et al. (2000). For the foundations
of such externalities and distinctions between different possible types of externalities, the reader can consult the
seminal work of Marshall (1920), recently inspiring a large number of papers, including Krugman (1991), David
and Rosenbloom (1990), Arthur (1990, 1994), and Fujita and Thisse (1996, 2002).
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this reason, models with a qualitative endogenous variable and particularly conditional
logit models have been widely used in the preceding empirical work on industrial
location.
This model assumes that firms maximize a profit function subject to uncertainty when
choosing a location. The deterministic component of the profit function consists of the
various attributes of locations that can influence the profitability of building a plant in a
particular location (Eq. (2)). The random component consists of maximization errors,
unobserved characteristics of choices or measurement errors. While the real underlying
profit yielded by alternative locations cannot be observed, what is observed is the actual
choice of each firm and the characteristics of the alternative locations.
There is a set I ¼ ð1; . . . ; i; . . . nÞ of possible location sites and the location i offers a
profit piðaÞ to an investor locating affiliate a.
There are two types of determinants of location. In order to capture the attractiveness of
location i to the representative investor (common to all investors, independent of time of
entry, the industry or the country of origin of the affiliate), we first introduce a fixed effect
for each location, denoted hi . Second, there is a set of variables UiðaÞ ¼ ½ln Xi1ðaÞ; . . . ;
ln XikðaÞ , with XiðaÞ ¼ ½Xi1ðaÞ; . . . ;XikðaÞ representing observable characteristics of
location i that vary across investors, since investors differ in the date of location chosen,
industry and country of origin.
The resulting profit equation yielded by location i to affiliate a is then
piðaÞ ¼ hi þ BUiðaÞ þ eiðaÞ;
where B is the vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated and eiðaÞ is the
unobservable advantage of location i for affiliate a. It is assumed that an investor chooses
location i if it yields higher profits than any other possible choice. The probability of
choosing i is thus
Prob½pjðaÞ < piðaÞ ¼ Prob½ejðaÞ < eiðaÞ þ hi  hj þ BUiðaÞ  BUjðaÞ bj p i:
Under a type I extreme value distribution of the error term, this probability of choosing
location i (denoted PiðaÞ) is known to take the following form (McFadden, 1984):
PiðaÞ ¼ e
hiþBUiðaÞPn
j¼1 ehjþBUjðaÞ
: ð3Þ
Using this formula for the probability of investing in each location, the coefficient on
each variable is then estimated by maximum likelihood. The expected signs and
magnitudes of those coefficients are dictated by Eq. (2).
We follow our theoretical model and take all variables in logs. As a consequence, all
coefficients can roughly be interpreted as elasticities for an ‘average’ investor of the
change of each variable in a location on the probability of investing in that location.
Indeed, it can be easily shown, using (3), that
APiðaÞ
AXi1ðaÞ
Xi1ðaÞ
PiðaÞ ¼ b1ð1 PiðaÞÞ;
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across investors of choosing a location i will be around 0.1. The coefficient on each
variable is therefore a slight overestimate of the elasticity of location choice probability
with respect to a change in this variable from its average value across the sample. We will
also be interested in calculating the marginal effect of a change in a variable (particularly
for count of firms variables), which is
APiðaÞ
AXi1ðaÞ ¼ b1ð1 PiðaÞÞ
PiðaÞ
Xi1ðaÞ :
3.1.2. Nested logit
The assumed distribution of the error term in the construction of the logit model ensures
a property of this model called the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). It can be
immediately seen from (3) that the ratio of probabilities of choosing two locations is
independent of the characteristics of any third location. Put differently, the choices should
all be equally substitutable to the investor. This assumption, however, has some chance of
being violated in our case, as we think that some de´partements will be closer substitutes
than others. A possible solution to this issue, adopted in papers by Hansen (1987),
Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Mayer and Mucchielli (1999), is to nest location choices
into a multiple-level tree structure in order to take into account the fact that some
de´partements have a higher level of substitution than others.
This nested logit specification (see Maddala, 1983, for a detailed description of this
model) involves three steps.
 First, specifying a tree structure, we propose two ‘natural’ structures here. We adopt the
French administrative grouping of the 92 de´partements into 21 regions (respectively
NUTS 3 and NUTS 2 levels of the Eurostat classification); this specification will be
labelled Nest 1. We also try to look at a very important distinction in France between
the Ile-de-France region,3 on the one hand, and the rest of France on the other; this
specification will be labelled Nest 2.
 The second step involves logit estimation of location choices at the lower level of the
tree (choice of de´partement), restricting the alternative choices to be within each
defined nest.
 In a third step, the consistency of the assumed tree structure must be checked
through a logit estimation of location choice at the upper level of the tree (choice of
region).
Stated formally, assume that, within the whole set I ¼ ð1 . . . ; i; . . . nÞ of possible
location sites, there are two (disjoint) sets of de´partements belonging respectively to
regions I and J. Suppose that de´partement i belongs to region I, and let us denote
with subscript iI the variables that vary across de´partements and regions and, with3 Regrouping Paris and its suburbs (and representing 29.3% of French GDP in 1995 against 2.2% of French
area).
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restated as
piIðaÞ ¼ hiI þ hI þ CUiIðaÞ þ DUIðaÞ þ eiIðaÞ:
The probability of choosing location i is now the product of choosing first I and then i
inside I, that is PiIðaÞ ¼ Pi j IðaÞPIðaÞ, with
Pi j IðaÞ ¼ e
hiIþCUiIðaÞP
jaI e
hjIþCUjIðaÞ ; ð4Þ
and
PIðaÞ ¼ e
hIþDUIðaÞþrIVI
ehIþDUIðaÞþrIVI þ ehJþDUJðaÞþrIVJ ; ð5Þ
where IVI ¼ lnðAjaI ehjIþCUjIðaÞÞ is called the inclusive value. The coefficient r is of
particular interest, since, if it takes a value of 1, the nested logit collapses to the standard
conditional logit model without a tree structure. If it is estimated to be 0, the de´partements
are estimated to be near perfect substitutes inside the region and only the region choice
matters. The tree structure is thus considered to have some relevance for the investor when
the inclusive value coefficient is significantly estimated to be between 0 and 1.
3.2. The data
3.2.1. The dependent variable
We consider location decisions by foreign investors in France. The left-hand side
variable needed is the location choice of each investor over all the 92 French de´parte-
ments4 with its nationality, date of investment and industry. The main database (IEF)
comes from the Direction du Tre´sor and was constructed based on the (now softened) legal
obligation for foreign firms to ask for an administrative authorization to invest in France.
This database reports much information on foreign affiliates operating in France, including
date and town of investment, employment, the different shareholders, their nationality and
respective shares, etc. We use the 1996 version of the database and consider investments
from 1985 to 1995, mainly because of data limitations on the right-hand side variables. We
only consider firms for which the industry reported is manufacturing. We sum up the
shares of foreign investors by country of origin and then keep only the firms for which the
largest share is held by a foreign country and for which this share is at least 10%. We
attribute the firm to the first country of ownership when several countries have shares in a
given firm.
The main problem of this database is that only the location of the headquarters is
reported. However, using the identification number of the firm, it is possible to track the
producing units belonging to the firm and then obtain its precise location using a different
database made available by the Ministry of Industry. The procedure was, therefore, the4 Which correspond to the NUTS 3 level in the Eurostat geographical classification of regions for France.
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belonged to a firm in IEF and were ‘born’ the same year or after the date reported in IEF.
The date of creation of the plant is inferred by looking at the first year where that
establishment was reported by the French Ministry of industry. This gives us our sample of
location choices, which consists of a close to exhaustive list of producing units owned by
foreign companies in France and established during that period. The sample contains 3902
observations over 206 industries.
3.2.2. Demand variable
Unlike most of the empirical literature on location choice,5 the demand variable taken
here is not local GDP. The French de´partements are of relatively small size and it seems
clear that foreign investors target consumers far beyond the frontier of the de´partement
they choose to locate in. However, transport costs make distant consumers more difficult
to reach and we must take this difficulty of access into account. We do so by using a
variable inspired by the concept of market potential introduced by Harris (1954):
MARKi ¼ GDPi þ
X
j p i
GDPj
dij
 
:
Our demand variable, labeled MARK, therefore takes into account the local GDP of the
chosen location and adds the GDPs of all other locations weighted by their distance to the
chosen location.
The source of the GDP data is REGIO, the Eurostat regional database that allocates
French GDP between French de´partements. The distance variable consists of real road
distances (fastest trip between the respective centers of the two de´partements) that were
collected using an electronic road atlas. MARK is, of course, only a proxy for the real
demand perceived by firms.
Hanson (1998) provides an empirical estimation of a theory-based market potential
which is a highly non-linear function requiring industry level estimates of transport
costs, local demand, local prices (wages) and elasticities of substitution. It is very
difficult here to obtain data that could allow for more sophisticated demand variables
at this geographical level. However, we believe that our proxy is reasonable for a
large proportion of the industries in the sample and the results seem to confirm this
belief.
3.2.3. Labour costs variable
We were able to calculate an industry-level wage per capita variable for each de´parte-
ment and year of our sample. Using data on producing units operating in each de´parte-
ment,6 we include the average wage per capita of the industry, de´partement and year5 A notable exception being Friedman et al. (1992), who use a demand variable similar to that used here in
their analysis of foreign investment in the United States.
6 When data were missing because the de´partement had no firm in the four-digit industry, we used an average
of the average national wage for this industry and the average wage across industries in this location.
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total wage bill paid in the industry divided by employment in this industry. Note that, in
this calculation, we keep only producing establishments of the considered industry,
de´partement and year combination.
3.2.4. Agglomeration variables
The agglomeration variables consist of cumulated counts of firms based on that sample.
The calculation follows Head et al. (1995) and consists of the count of firms belonging to
the same industry (but not belonging to the same parent company) that were located in
each de´partement a year before the considered investment.
We introduce here new dimensions in the measurement of agglomeration effects. We
first try to identify the ‘nationality’ of the agglomerative force. We try to answer the
following question: Does a firm exhibit the same tendency to cluster with other firms
from the same country of origin, other non-French firms and/or French firms? There will
therefore be three agglomeration variables: NH, NO and NF accounting, respectively, for
the effect of the presence of same home country firms, other foreign firms and French
firms. The sign and magnitude of each coefficient on those variables depend on the
relative strengths of the competition effect and positive externalities exposed in the
theory section. A comparison of coefficients on those variables will enable us to draw
insights into the possibly different effects depending on different nationalities of the
investors.
Three precisions need to be made here in terms of interpretation. First, note that we
follow Head et al. (1995) and assume a specification of those agglomeration effects that is
linear in logs, of the form NHeNO fNFg, where e, f and g are (very close to) the respective
elasticities of the probability of choosing a de´partement (see Section 3.1). We have a
particular interest in assessing whether the elasticities of those variables are the same
(e ¼ f ¼ g) in that specification.
Second, we are able, due to the large size of the sample, to differentiate between
country of origin and industry in the location behavior of multinational firms. This is, of
course, of primary importance for policy issues as it will appear that there is a large
amount of heterogeneity, calling for different measures by public authorities if they intend
to attract FDI and conduct regional policies.
Third, agglomeration variables are constructed in a way to take into account neigh-
boring location sites. It is very likely that competition forces and/or agglomeration benefits
that we try to capture with those covariates span over administrative borders of de´parte-
ments. Head et al. (1995) try to account for this by adding counts of firms from
neighboring states. We prefer to remain consistent with our approach on demand and
specify the three variables as distance-weighted counts of firms:7
NHi ¼ Home firms counti þ
X
j p i
Home firms countj
dij
 
þ 1;7 We add one to all these variables as in Head et al. (1995) because, at the detailed industry level, we consider
that there are numerous cases where counts of firms are zero, specially for NH.
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X
j p i
Other foreign firms countj
dij
 
þ 1;
NFi ¼ French firms counti þ
X
j p i
French firms countj
dij
 
þ 1:
3.2.5. Distance to home country variable
As shown below, the location choices of FDI are also influenced by proximity to the
investor’s home market. We take into account this tendency of foreign firms to invest in
locations near their country through a distance variable labeled DIS. It is calculated as the
great circle distance between the capital city of the investing firm’s country of origin and
the capital city of each de´partement available as a location. We chose, however, to take
Chicago for the USA, Toronto for Canada and Frankfurt for Germany, although, in this
work, the precise location of the city chosen does not really impact significantly on the
relative distances to each de´partement.
3.2.6. Grants variables
The main instrument of regional policy available to the French government is called the
Prime d’Ame´nagement du Territoire (PAT) and consists of labor-related grants for creating
or maintaining jobs in lagging regions. Both French and foreign investments are eligible
for these grants and about half the annual funding goes to foreign investors. We estimate
the influence of this policy instrument on location choice by introducing a variable called
PAT, which takes into account the funds granted to each region for the year of the
considered investment.
Some French regions are also eligible for the European Commission regional policy in-
volving grants that are sometimes used to attract FDI, butmost of the time consists of attempts
to improve the economic environment with an expected indirect effect on attractiveness.
In the time period we consider, there were three main types of funds which the
Commission granted to French regions: Objective 2, Objective 5b, and ‘community
initiatives’ funds.8 Objective 2 aims at promoting the conversion of areas affected by
industrial decline. Objective 5b is aimed at rural areas affected by problems linked to the
decline of agriculture.9 There are numerous French regions receiving grants under those
two objectives, the two main receivers being Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Lorraine. We also
include the ‘community initiatives’ funds.10 The corresponding variables are the grants8 There were no funds given under Objective 1 (granted to regions with GDP per head below 75% of the
Union average) in our sample.
9 These funds are targeted towards ‘‘vulnerable rural areas’’ and are used in order to promote
‘‘Diversification of activities, product quality, rural tourism . . . training schemes with the key aim of creating
employment’’. They do not incorporate subsidies to agricultural production and are totally separated from the
Common Agricultural Policy measures.
10 These are four special programmes, currently absorbing 5.35%of the budget of the Structural Funds: Interreg
III (promotes cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation), Urban II (supports ‘‘innovative strategies to
regenerate cities and declining urban areas’’), Leader+ (‘‘new local strategies for sustainable development’’), and
Equal (‘‘seeks to eliminate the factors leading to inequalities and discrimination in the labour market’’).
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HOBJ.11
The data made publicly available by the European Commission is surprisingly scarce.
However, we were able to gather data on grants by Objective and region in France for the
years 1989, 1990 and 1991, which were the years when FDI was at its peak in France. We
can therefore estimate the influence of those grants on the location decisions of foreign
investors for those three years because the number of observations remains substantial.
The PAT grants were not much easier to collect and we are able to assess their influence
over the years 1985, 1986, 1987, 1991 and 1994. Note that all data on grants is available at
the NUTS 2 level, that is at a more aggregated geographical level than the level at which
we observe location choices (NUTS 3).4. Results
4.1. Spatial patterns of investment
Figs. 1 and 2 show the spatial distribution of foreign affiliates in France for investors
originating from other European countries. The size of the circles represents the number of
investments received by the de´partement (all affiliates in the de´partement being attributed
to the central city for this graph).
It is readily apparent that the region around Paris has been a major recipient of
investments for FDI from all origin countries. It is also striking that some investors
have a preference for locations in France that are near the border with their origin
country. This is particularly apparent for FDI originating from Belgium, The Nether-
lands, Germany and Switzerland. Similarities in culture, language, tastes, distribution
networks, etc. might therefore be an important determinant of location choices by
investors originating from a country that has a common border with France. This
behavior is to be compared with other econometric relationships uncovered in
international trade and FDI studies exhibiting a positive impact of cultural similarity
on goods or factor flows. Concerning trade flows, for instance, it is well known that a
common language constitutes a powerful motivation for bilateral trade. Furthermore, it
has recently been reported by Rauch (1999) and Rose (2000), for instance, that
colonial ties have a strong positive effect on trade. Rauch (2001) surveys several
papers, finding a positive impact on bilateral trade of migrants from the partner
country.
Our interpretation of this pattern is that regions in France that share a border with the
country of origin of the investor offer important advantages in the trade-off between the
costs of operating abroad and access to French consumers: whereas those locations might
not offer ideal access to the remaining French consumers, they present a whole set of
features that are common with the country of origin of the investor and can therefore
reduce the cost of operating abroad.11 More details on these funds and the European Union regional policy goals and instruments in general can
be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/index_en.htm.
Fig. 1. Patterns of foreign affiliates in France: FDI from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.
Fig. 2. Patterns of foreign affiliates in France: FDI from Italy, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
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4.2. Econometric results
Table 1 reports results using four different specifications on the complete sample of
investments. The first column gives coefficients of a standard conditional logit estimation,
which gives a benchmark to which various specifications will be compared. The second
column reports estimates from a fixed effects (NUTS 3 dummy variables) conditional
logit. The last two columns report coefficients from nested logit estimations where the
upper level choice is NUTS 2 regions (Nest 1) and Ile-de-France versus the rest of France
(Nest 2). For these two estimations, coefficients on the inclusive values are reported at the
bottom of the table.
Results in the first column show, as expected, a positive influence of the market
potential and a negative influence of wages. We also obtain a positive effect of the
presence of competitors. This shows that agglomeration forces dominate dispersion
forces on average, this finding being an indicator of spillovers that might exist between
firms. It is noteworthy that the coefficient on agglomeration with French firms is much
higher than agglomeration with other foreign firms, either of the same or a different
country of origin. This might indicate that the competition faced by a foreign investor in
France is fiercer with other foreign firms than with French firms. This might also be a
sign that the technological spillovers passing through informal communications or the
inter-firm mobility of qualified workers is substantially easier with French firms.
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Choice of location of foreign investors in France
Dependent variable: chosen de´partement
Model: Nest 1 Nest 2
Fixed effect: No NUTS 3 NUTS 3 NUTS 3
Ln proximity of same 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.11 0.21***
home country firms (ln NH) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
Ln proximity of other 0.35*** 0.47*** 0.54*** 0.52***
foreign firms (ln NO) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Ln proximity of French 0.89*** 1.03*** 1.29*** 1.25***
firms (ln NF) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Ln market 0.35*** 2.83*** 2.31** 1.79**
potential (ln MARK) (0.03) (0.69) (1.16) (0.84)
Ln wage (lnW )  0.43***  0.16  0.18  0.07
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)
Ln distance to  0.75***  0.78***  1.67***  0.74***
home country (ln DIS) (0.05) (0.06) (0.34) (0.06)
No. obs.
3902 3902 3902 3902
Pseudo-R2 0.164 0.185 0.241 0.173
Fixed effect NUTS 2 Ile de France
Inclusive value 0.56*** 0.34***
(0.02) (0.03)
Pseudo-R2 0.199 0.128
Note: standard errors in parentheses with significance at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
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(see Banerjee, 1992; De Coster and Strange, 1993, for theoretical models). Suppose that
French firms have better information than foreign companies on the ‘true’ comparitive
attractiveness of French de´partements. The location of French firms would therefore
convey more information than the location of foreign affiliates for a prospective investor.
As a consequence, foreign investors would be more willing to replicate French firms’
choices than choices made by other multinational companies, which might have
information no better than theirs.
Informational externalities of that kind, where foreign firms ‘learn’ through
proximity with French firms, might also result from labor market spillovers, i.e. from
information transmitted by hired local workers who previously worked for French
competitors.
As highlighted in Section 3.1, the coefficients on these variables are slight over-
estimates of the elasticity of the probability of a location being chosen with respect to
the agglomeration variables. The exact formula of this elasticity for a given affiliate a is
bð1 PiðaÞÞ, where b is the estimated coefficient. In our sample, the average probability
of a location being chosen is P¯ ¼ 0:092.
However, a 10% increase in NH is very different from a 10% increase in NF,
because there are many more French firms, on average, than foreign firms in each
de´partement/industry/year combination. Adding one more foreign firm will very often
result in a 100% increase in NH, while adding one more French firm will, most of the
time, be associated with a very low percentage increase in NF.12 It is therefore also
interesting to look at the effect of a unitary increase in each of those variable on the
probability of attracting the next investments. For a change in NH, for instance, this is
given for the average investor by bNHð1 P¯ÞðP¯=NHÞ. The resulting figures for those
marginal effects are 0.018 for NH, 0.020 for NO and 0.014 for NF. A unitary increase
in French firms’ agglomeration variable therefore has a lower impact on the probability
of future location choices than the same increase in the number of foreign firms. The
message yielded by these elasticities and marginal effects on agglomeration effects is
the following. While foreign investors predominantly follow the location patterns of
local (French) firms, hosting one additional foreign firm yields more benefit to
subsequent attractiveness than hosting one more French firm. Local authorities com-
peting for investments or regional policies trying to promote spatial equity in FDI
location patterns should therefore target FDI in order to achieve their goals. Whether
those authorities have instruments that can actually influence location choices of first
foreign investors in order to trigger cumulative agglomeration of FDI is a different issue
that will be investigated in Section 5.
The fixed effect regression in column 2 is mainly characterized by a very important
increase of the coefficient on market potential and a very large decrease in the coefficient12 Recall that our agglomeration variables in i are 1 + local count of firms in i + remote count of firms
weighted by distance to i . Therefore, a unitary increase in NHi , for instance, can be interpreted as a new
investment in i or as an increase in investments in neighboring de´partements that yield the same overall rise in
NHi once discounted by bilateral distance.
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therefore seems to be much more important for attractiveness than differences in perceived
demand across de´partements. On the contrary, it appears that the time-invariant component
of wage differences across French regions is far more important than a wage increase over
time.13
With respect to nested logit estimations, both tree structures have coefficients on
inclusive values that are highly significant and within the 0–1 range, which indicates that
the tree structure is indeed relevant. The Nest 1 specification, however, seems to offer a
higher overall fit in both estimation steps. Here again, the market potential effect is much
higher than in the benchmark estimation, which means that, inside a NUTS 2 region,
investors are very sensitive to choosing the highest demand de´partement, whereas this is
less apparent when choices are considered independently of the chosen NUTS 2 region.
An important result emerging from the nested specification is that the wage variable loses
significance. This is apparent in both nests, but especially true for the Nest 2 specification,
suggesting that the main explanation for the negative coefficient in the column 1
benchmark specification is the very large gap between wages in Ile-de-France and
elsewhere in France (in 1990, for instance, our wage variable was, on average, 30%
higher in Ile-de-France than in the rest of the country). Another important result appearing
in Nest 1 is that the coefficient on NH decreases and becomes insignificant, indicating that,
inside each NUTS 2 region, the agglomeration behavior with respect to firms from the
same country of origin is much less powerful. On the contrary, the coefficient on local
firms (NF) is substantially increased, suggesting an important role for local agglomeration
economies.
We now proceed to the estimation of location choice determinants of foreign investors
in France by country of origin. We present in Table 2 the results for three different pooled
regressions where certain coefficients are allowed to differ across countries of origin. We
focus on the eight main countries investing in France, that is the United States (21.3% of
total location choices), Germany (16.2%), the Netherlands (12.5%), Italy (10.8%), the
United Kingdom (10.4%), Switzerland (9.4%), Belgium (6.4%), and Japan (2.1%).
Regressions are run without fixed effects, and with NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 fixed effects
in the three estimations. Three variables are interacted with country of origin dummy
variables: agglomeration with same home country competitors, market potential and
wages.
The results show substantial variability depending on the country of origin of the firm.
Some countries, such as Italy and the Netherlands, show very low agglomeration effects
compared to the rest of the sample and are less driven towards high market potential areas
than the others. These two countries, as Belgium, are also much more sensitive to the level
of labor costs in their location choices, these results being largely robust to alternative
fixed effects specifications. The American investors seem to search out very productive
workers despite their higher cost, as shown by the positive coefficient on wages.13 Note that this pattern is common to other comparable location choice studies. Devereux and Griffith
(1998) and Head et al. (1999) also conduct conditional logit estimations with fixed effects and find insignificant
or even positive coefficients on wages. Both papers attribute those results to the attraction of foreign investors
towards locations endowed with highly skilled workers, a feature that might also be valid here.
Table 2
Location choice of foreign investors in France by country
Fixed effect No NUTS 2 NUTS 3
Ln proximity of other
foreign firms (ln NO) 0.43*** (0.04) 0.42*** (0.04) 0.50*** (0.04)
Ln proximity of French
firms (ln NF) 1.01*** (0.03) 1.03*** (0.03) 1.11*** (0.03)
Ln proximity of same home country firms (ln NH)
Belgium 0.70** (0.27) 0.66** (0.27) 0.56** (0.28)
Netherlands  0.81*** (0.25)  0.82*** (0.25)  0.58** (0.26)
Germany  0.01 (0.14)  0.09 (0.14) 0.03 (0.14)
Italy  0.50* (0.30)  0.44 (0.30)  0.08 (0.31)
UK 0.56*** (0.21) 0.57*** (0.21) 0.67*** (0.20)
USA 0.13 (0.11) 0.23** (0.10) 0.21** (0.11)
Japan 1.51** (0.67) 1.63** (0.67) 1.50** (0.66)
Switzerland 0.12 (0.17) 0.18 (0.17) 0.10 (0.17)
Other countries 0.91** (0.43) 0.80* (0.42) 0.63 (0.42)
Ln market potential (ln MARK)
Belgium 0.54*** (0.10) 0.63*** (0.10) 2.77*** (0.70)
Netherlands 0.04 (0.08) 0.12 (0.08) 2.15*** (0.70)
Germany 0.28*** (0.06) 0.38*** (0.07) 2.44*** (0.70)
Italy  0.11 (0.07)  0.02 (0.08) 2.01*** (0.70)
UK 0.41*** (0.08) 0.50*** (0.09) 2.64*** (0.70)
USA 0.24*** (0.06) 0.32*** (0.06) 2.40*** (0.70)
Japan 0.71*** (0.16) 0.82*** (0.16) 3.04*** (0.72)
Switzerland 0.32*** (0.08) 0.39*** (0.09) 2.47*** (0.70)
Other countries 0.43*** (0.07) 0.53*** (0.08) 2.66*** (0.70)
Ln Wage (ln W)
Belgium  1.32*** (0.33)  1.18*** (0.34)  1.15*** (0.35)
Netherlands  1.13*** (0.24)  1.02*** (0.25)  0.71*** (0.25)
Germany  0.15 (0.24) 0.03 (0.25) 0.08 (0.25)
Italy  1.50*** (0.20)  1.51*** (0.21)  1.23*** (0.22)
UK  0.18 (0.30)  0.03 (0.31) 0.02 (0.31)
USA 0.76*** (0.20) 0.88*** (0.20) 0.90*** (0.20)
Japan  0.50 (0.60)  0.29 (0.60)  0.40 (0.58)
Switzerland 0.02 (0.32) 0.25 (0.32) 0.33 (0.33)
Other countries 0.24 (0.31) 0.48 (0.31) 0.53* (0.31)
Ln distance to home
country (ln DIS)  0.67*** (0.06)  0.71*** (0.06)  0.72*** (0.07)
No. obs.
3902 3902 3902
Pseudo-R2 0.175 0.18 0.194
Note: standard errors in parentheses with significance at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
M. Crozet et al. / Regional Science and Urban Economics 34 (2004) 27–5442This very large dataset enables us to uncover important differences in firms’ behavior in
terms of clustering. While, on average, firms tend to follow the choices of competitors
from the same country, there are large differences depending on the nationality of the
M. Crozet et al. / Regional Science and Urban Economics 34 (2004) 27–54 43investor. Belgian firms, for instance, tend to follow Belgian competitors approximately as
strongly as firms from the Netherlands tend to avoid other firms from the Netherlands.
This is one of the first studies where such heterogeneity, informative of the relative
strength of competition and agglomeration effects, has been identified. It is also
noteworthy that the coefficient on this variable, while it can be of either sign in theory,
has never to our knowledge been reported as being significantly negative. Overall, the
investors most sensitive to agglomeration effects are the Japanese, English, Belgian and
American, while those most sensitive to dispersion forces are Dutch, Italian and, to a lesser
extent, German.
4.3. The learning process of foreign investment
A possible explanation for the negative sign of distance from the origin country on
location choice is that proximate de´partements share common characteristics with the
origin country that make them particularly favorable sites for location.14 The reason why
some investors show a preference for regions in France contiguous with their home market
might be a trade-off between access to French consumers and ease of operation. The
disadvantage faced by foreign affiliates with respect to local firms due to their poorer
knowledge of the characteristics of the local market is one of the oldest ideas in the theory
of FDI (see Hirsch, 1976, for instance). Let us consider the example of German FDI in
France. It is likely that locations in France near the German border share sufficient
common ‘cultural’ characteristics with Germany so that the cost of operating there
(relative to local firms) is lower, ceteris paribus, than the cost of operating in more
western locations in France.
The existence of transport costs, however, does not make those locations ideal basing
points to serve the majority of French consumers. The trade-off could then work as
follows. Suppose that firms gradually learn the characteristics of the French market once
they have an affiliate anywhere in France. The first waves of German investment could
then be concentrated near the German border in order to reduce the disadvantage of being
a foreign affiliate. The next waves could gradually move west in order to improve access
to consumers because firms have learned some of the characteristics of the market, thereby
reducing their initial disadvantage.
Support for this intuition can be found by looking at the evolution of the coefficient on
distance and market potential. We expect an increase in both, the first becoming less
negative with time and the second more positive. If following your rivals also contributes
to reducing your information gathering costs about the characteristics of the French
market, we should then also expect a decrease in the coefficient on NH.
Fig. 3 plots the three coefficients (and their respective 5% confidence intervals) over the
period of our sample and confirms the expected evolution for all three variables.15 The14 One might also envision that this result reflects a relocation pattern of FDI: investors look for a location in
France near their home market to enjoy relatively low production costs compared with those they face in their
own country, without increasing the transport cost to their home market too much. While this explanation might
be plausible for Swiss or German investors, it does not seem very likely for Belgian or Dutch ones.
15 In order to improve the stability and robustness of the estimations, we run logits for each couple of
successive years (1985–1986, 1986–1987, etc.).
Fig. 3. Evolution of coefficients over time.
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the coefficient on the market potential variable. The coefficient on distance starts at  1.09
and ends at  0.33: in the beginning of the sample, reducing the distance from the country
of origin by 50% increases the probability of receiving an investment by roughly 50%, but
by only about 15% at the end. We interpret this as evidence of some learning process of
foreign investors, gradually moving from ‘familiar’ locations near the country of origin to
more central locations in France, where access to consumers is better. It should also be noted
that the coefficient on same country of origin competitors shifts from clustering behavior to
avoiding behavior (the coefficient is significantly negative at the end of the period).
Table 3 gives regression results where the main variables of interest are interacted with
time period dummies (one for years 1985 to 1990, the other for the period 1991 to 1995) in
order to examine the evolution of coefficients over time, both in a standard conditional
logit specification and in a fixed effects specification. Confirming expectations from the
learning process hypothesis and the trends in Fig. 3, the distance coefficient is lower (in
absolute value) in the second subperiod, and the coefficient on NH also decreases sharply.
The rise in the market potential coefficient is less important, but the figure shows that this
rise is most pronounced in the latest years, suggesting that expanding the dataset to more
recent years might reveal a more important increasing trend.
4.4. Results by industry
We end this section by proceeding to regressions at the industry level to examine which
industries exhibit the most significant agglomeration effects and thus potentially constitute
the most interesting targets for promotion policies, as an initial advantage in the attraction
of those industries could then result in self-reinforcing agglomeration in the de´partements
making a good start. Due to the very large sample used we are able to conduct the analysis
Table 3
Location choice of foreign investors: evolution of coefficients
Model: Dep. var: chosen de´partement
Fixed effect No NUTS 3
Ln proximity of same home 0.62*** 0.58***
country firms (ln NH)*(85–90) (0.10) (0.10)
Ln proximity of same home  0.18** 0.00
country firms (ln NH)*(91–95) (0.09) (0.08)
Ln proximity of other 0.28*** 0.47***
foreign firms (ln NO)*(85–90) (0.06) (0.06)
Ln proximity of other 0.43*** 0.48***
foreign firms (ln NO)*(90–95) (0.05) (0.05)
Ln proximity of French 0.88*** 1.01***
firms (ln NF)*(85–90) (0.04) (0.04)
Ln proximity of French 0.97*** 1.06***
firms (ln NF)*(91–95) (0.04) (0.04)
Ln market potential 0.27*** 1.74**
(ln MARK)*(85–90) (0.05) (0.74)
Ln market potential 0.41*** 1.92***
(ln MARK)*(91–95) (0.04) (0.72)
Ln wage  0.59***  0.35**
(ln W )*(85–90) (0.14) (0.15)
Ln wage  0.25**  0.02
(ln W )*(91–95) (0.13) (0.13)
Ln distance to home  0.95***  0.96***
country (ln DIS)*(85–90) (0.07) (0.08)
Ln distance to home  0.53***  0.61***
country (ln DIS)*(91–95) (0.07) (0.08)
No. obs. 3902 3902
Pseudo-R2 0.167 0.186
Note: standard errors in parentheses with significance at the ***1% and **5% level.
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more subject to agglomeration economies. Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A rank
industries using the average values of the three agglomeration variable coefficients. Table
A.1 lists industries for which all three agglomeration variables have significant positive
signs, and Table A.2 lists the other industries. There are 76 industries for which estimation
of all variables is possible. Of these, eight have all three agglomeration variables
significantly positive.
We see that industries often regarded as being characterized by strong positive
spillovers appear in the first group of industries where we find very significant
agglomeration effects. Computers are, of course, one of these, as is office machinery,
for which the coefficients are extremely large. A 10% increase in the number of firms in a
de´partement roughly increasing the probability of investing there by 40% for this industry.
Another interesting result is the fact that, in the clothing industry, often referred to as
being characteristic of a low-skill, labor-intensive industry, investors are very sensitive to
wage differentials and much less to agglomeration economies. On the other hand, industries
with significant agglomeration effects do not seem to be sensitive to the level of labor costs.
M. Crozet et al. / Regional Science and Urban Economics 34 (2004) 27–5446We are therefore able to confirm differences in the location decisions of investors across
industries that were previously largely hypothesized in the literature without being
rigorously tested due to lack of data. We find, in particular, that industries that are often
thought to be characterized by strong agglomeration economies more than labor cost
considerations (such as computers, machine tools and car parts) indeed show this tendency.
Conversely, low-skill industries such as clothing are not very sensitive to agglomeration
economies, but seem to favor cost differentials. Also, industries that are closely spatially
tied to final consumption such as magazines or newspapers show an overwhelming
tendency to follow the spatial distribution of consumers rather than the spatial distribution
of competitors.5. The influence of regional policies on location choice
In this section, we estimate the influence of structural funds granted to French regions
by the European Commission and of the main measure of French regional policy, the
Prime d’Ame´nagement du Territoire (PAT). We first present several specifications of
pooled regressions and then specific regressions by country of origin. Recall that, for all
the regressions of this section, the number of observations is constrained by the availability
of grants data. We consider location choices over 3 years for European structural funds and
5 years for the PAT.
5.1. Pooled results
Table 4 presents results for eight different specifications incorporating grant variables.
The first four columns incorporate structural funds and the last four incorporate the PAT.16
For the two types of grant variables, we consider first a benchmark estimation without
grant variables followed by a conditional logit estimation incorporating the grants and then
two fixed effects estimations (one with NUTS 2 dummy variables and one with NUTS 3
dummy variables).
We see from columns 2 and 6 of the table that only community initiative grants and
PAT coefficients are significantly positive. Furthermore, even for these grants, the size of
the effect is smaller by an order of magnitude than for most other significant
determinants. This means that, even in the few cases where some results of such
policies are to be expected, they will be very largely outweighed by agglomeration or
market potential considerations.
Our pooled results therefore leave little prospect for a major role of EU regional
policies in reshaping the location patterns of FDI. Note first that we consider
coordinated regional policy measures and not measures used unilaterally by individual
regions to attract firms, such as tax cuts or subsidies. Our results are therefore not
contradictory with papers by Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Head et al. (1999), for16 We choose to present results separately for the two types of grants because there is only one year (1991)
for which data are available for all grants. Regressions for this year (available upon request) show virtually no
change in the coefficients on grants.
Table 4
Influence of regional policies on location choice
Dependent variable: chosen de´partement
Fixed effect: NUTS 3 No NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 3 No NUTS 2 NUTS 3
Ln proximity of same home 0.34*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.33*** 0.21** 0.21** 0.21** 0.21**
country firms (ln NH) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Ln proximity of other 0.55*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.54*** 0.47*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.47***
foreign firms (ln NO) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Ln proximity of 1.06*** 0.93*** 0.94*** 1.07*** 1.05*** 0.95*** 0.97*** 1.05***
French firms (ln NF) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Ln market  1.66 0.34*** 0.28***  3.13 3.57*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 3.62***
potential (ln MARK) (2.67) (0.06) (0.08) (2.84) (0.91) (0.05) (0.06) (0.91)
Ln wage (lnW )  0.39**  0.59***  0.48***  0.38** 0.00 0.00  0.06 0.00
(0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Ln distance to home  0.80***  0.79***  0.77***  0.81***  0.75***  0.74***  0.74***  0.75***
country (ln DIS) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Ln objective 2 0.00  0.03**  0.03*
grant (ln OBJ2) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln objective 5b 0.01 0.00  0.01
grant (ln OBJ5b) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln community initiative 0.03*** 0.00 0.00
grants (ln HOBJ) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln French regional 0.04*** 0.02 0.02
policy (ln PAT) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
No. obs. 1264 1264 1264 1264 1803 1803 1803 1803
Pseudo-R2 0.193 0.166 0.172 0.194 0.192 0.17 0.173 0.192
Note: standard errors in parentheses with significance at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
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M. Crozet et al. / Regional Science and Urban Economics 34 (2004) 27–5448instance, which showed that firms are sensitive to tax and subsidy differentials in their
location choice. Note also that this paper is not the first to find little or no effect of
European structural funds on regional attractiveness and growth (see Boldrin and
Canova, 2001; Ferrer, 1998; Martin, 1998). This does not necessarily mean that these
policies are inefficient, but it casts doubt on the idea that the regional policy of the
European Commission can actually influence or even reverse the ‘natural’ location
patterns of economic activity in Europe.
There is a problem with the evaluation of the influence of these funds which is often
mentioned to explain the apparent poor and even sometimes negative influence of these
grants. Regional policies are designed to help lagging regions catch up or to compensate
for a reduction in employment due to a structural crisis in the industries in which these
regions specialize. The fact that a region is not successful at attracting FDI is often a cause
of its economic problems and the consequence of this can be a negative coefficient on the
grant variable observed by the researcher.
In order to address this potential problem and assess if an increase in the grants
received by a region has a positive influence on location choice after having controlled for
the structural characteristics of that region, we run fixed effects logits for structural funds
and PAT in columns 3, 4 and 7, 8, respectively. Far from improving the estimated impact
of those grants, the significantly positive coefficients become insignificant and Objective 2
funds are even found to have a significantly negative influence. The geographical level of
the fixed effect does not change the results in any way whether or not we control for the
constant characteristics of NUTS 3 or NUTS 2 regions.
We further evaluated the robustness of this apparent inefficiency of European grants on
regional attractiveness by assessing the influence of past European regional policy on
present location choices. Most structural funds are spent on transport, communication or
other types of public infrastructure. Over time, the funds might have therefore improved
the attractiveness of the region and investors in subsequent years might be less repelled by
this region.17 We therefore estimate the impact of the overall funds received by French
regions between 1989 and 1991 on the choices between 1992 and 1995 and compare the
coefficients with the preceding regression. In order to save space, we do not include the
results table here (they are available upon request), but the results are broadly similar. Only
one coefficient is significantly positive and all estimates of the impact of regional
European grants are of very low magnitude.
The pooled specifications therefore do not show any significant impact of regional
policy measures that we were able to include in the analysis. However, some investors
might be more sensitive than others to financial incentives in their location choice, leaving
potential room for targeted policies. We now turn to an investigation of this possibility.
5.2. Results by country of origin
We concentrate here on assessing the impact of PAT because of the longer time
period available and also because PAT is a more direct instrument for attracting FDI17 Note that this argument does not hold for PAT, since this measure is direct aid to a firm investing in a
lagging region.
Table 5
Influence of regional policies on location choice by country
Fixed effect No NUTS 2 NUTS 3
Ln proximity of other
foreign firms (ln NO) 0.50*** (0.06) 0.49*** (0.06) 0.54*** (0.06)
Ln proximity of
French firms (ln NF) 1.11*** (0.04) 1.14*** (0.04) 1.17*** (0.04)
Ln proximity of same home country firms (ln NH)
Belgium 0.49 (0.41) 0.59 (0.41) 0.50 (0.42)
Netherlands  2.35*** (0.49)  2.43*** (0.49)  2.07*** (0.51)
Germany  0.18 (0.23)  0.26 (0.23)  0.17 (0.22)
Italy 0.08 (0.47) 0.12 (0.48) 0.23 (0.49)
UK 0.10 (0.34) 0.10 (0.35) 0.22 (0.34)
USA 0.13 (0.15) 0.15 (0.15) 0.16 (0.15)
Japan 0.55 (1.15) 0.57 (1.15) 0.59 (1.07)
Switzerland  0.25 (0.26)  0.24 (0.26)  0.38 (0.26)
Other countries 1.41** (0.56) 1.30** (0.56) 1.13** (0.56)
Ln market
potential (ln MARK) By country—not reported
Ln wage (ln W)
Belgium  1.40*** (0.44)  1.45*** (0.43)  1.47*** (0.44)
Netherlands 0.46 (0.59) 0.37 (0.59) 0.28 (0.59)
Germany 0.07 (0.36)  0.02 (0.36) 0.06 (0.36)
Italy  1.16*** (0.34)  1.32*** (0.35)  1.09*** (0.36)
UK  0.36 (0.51)  0.41 (0.51)  0.38 (0.51)
USA 0.83*** (0.27) 0.80*** (0.27) 0.78*** (0.28)
Japan 0.81 (0.94) 0.79 (0.95) 0.64 (0.94)
Switzerland 0.35 (0.48) 0.38 (0.48) 0.51 (0.48)
Other countries 0.81 (0.50) 0.80 (0.50) 0.89* (0.50)
Ln French regional policy (ln PAT)
Belgium 0.07** (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03)
Netherlands 0.03 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
Germany 0.08*** (0.02) 0.05* (0.03) 0.05** (0.03)
Italy 0.15*** (0.02) 0.11*** (0.03) 0.08*** (0.03)
UK 0.01 (0.02)  0.02 (0.03)  0.01 (0.03)
USA 0.01 (0.01)  0.03 (0.02)  0.03 (0.02)
Japan 0.04 (0.05) 0.00 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05)
Switzerland 0.01 (0.02)  0.03 (0.03)  0.03 (0.03)
Other countries 0.07*** (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03)
Ln distance to home
country (ln DIS)  0.57*** (0.08)  0.54*** (0.10)  0.59*** (0.10)
No. obs. 1803 1803 1803
Pseudo-R2 0.185 0.188 0.204
Note: standard errors in parentheses with significance at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
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grants on FDI flows by arguing that they have as an objective to promote regional
development and attractiveness, but not to directly affect location choices. On the
contrary, PAT is explicitly a direct regional policy in favor of foreign investments.
However, we see from Table 5 that the impact of French regional policy (at least its
observable part measured as PAT funds) is far from being as influential on location
choices as the policy makers would like it to be, even when investigating different
origin countries in detail.
This table reproduces the estimations of Table 2 for the sample of years where PAT
data are available and adding interacted variables between PAT grants and origin
country dummies. The only three countries for which we find a positive impact are
Belgium, Germany and Italy in the first regression, and the impact for Belgium loses
significance with NUTS 3 fixed effects. Even for those countries, the effect of grants
on location choice is relatively marginal in magnitude when compared to other
determinants.
The Italian case is very interesting as it appears that investors from this country are very
sensitive to monetary incentives compared to other investors. Indeed, the positive effect of
grants is highly significant and the largest of all countries. Furthermore, Italian firms also
prove to be among the most highly sensitive to wage differentials and show little tendency
to agglomerate relative to other countries.
Our study therefore leaves very little prospect for an efficient regional policy.
Indeed, the investors that are sensitive to these measures are only slightly so and
do not cluster much, hence the benefits of grants to the region are likely to be
very small. Success in attracting initial investments from these countries is not
sufficient to generate a self-reinforcing agglomeration of firms from those
countries.6. Conclusion
We assess in this paper the determinants of location choice of foreign investors in
France. We focus in particular on the existence and magnitude of agglomeration
economies and identify the countries of origin and industries for which positive
spillovers suggested by the observed clustering between firms are more pronounced.
It appears that computers, car parts, machine tools and office machinery are examples
of sectors characterized by the strongest agglomeration effects. A 10% increase in the
number of competitors in a location can increase by up to 40% the average
probability of investing in that location. On the other hand, firms originating from
countries such as Italy or the Netherlands and from industries such as clothing are
much less subject to clustering and more sensitive to the level of wages in their
location patterns.
We also uncovered general patterns of FDI location that, to our knowledge, have not
been the subject of rigorous empirical investigation. Among these, the location behavior of
foreign firms in France seems to suggest that a learning process takes place in location
choice over time. Firms tend to choose locations in France that are near their home market
M. Crozet et al. / Regional Science and Urban Economics 34 (2004) 27–54 51throughout the whole period, particularly when the investor is from Germany, Belgium,
Switzerland or the Netherlands. However, this pattern gradually fades over the period
studied as the impact of market potential becomes larger and clustering behavior becomes
weaker. We interpret this evolution as evidence of learning about French market character-
istics by foreign firms. As time passes it becomes more and more important to be near the
final demand and less and less important to be in locations sharing common attributes with
the home country.
Finally, we attempted to assess the impact of French and European regional
policies through the inclusion of investment incentives and structural funds in the
location choice, but found hardly any positive impact of either measure on the
actual choices of investors. Even if important agglomeration economies might be
favorable grounds for effective attractiveness and regional policies, the evidence for
France is very negative. We do not find any increase in the attractiveness of
French de´partements when investing there is associated with grants from public
authorities.Acknowledgements
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Ministry of Finance.Appendix A. Location choice determinants by industryTable A.1
Most agglomerated industries
Industry No. obs. NH NO NF MARK W DIS
Office machinery 9 3.98** 3.63* 5.44***  2.00** 0.81  1.85
Lightning 19 2.38** 2.26*** 2.22***  1.44*** 0.71  1.46*
Machine tools 23 1.67* 1.53*** 1.43*** 0.70**  0.67  1.21**
Misc. rubber 36 1.98*** 1.12*** 1.47*** 0.36  0.97  0.90
Lifts 85 1.41** 0.47* 1.67***  0.34  1.08*  0.02
Computers 71 1.07*** 0.99*** 1.47***  0.51* 1.11** 0.67
Paints 65 0.93** 0.92*** 1.48***  0.22  0.63 0.03
Car parts 115 0.59*** 0.35* 1.08*** 0.10 0.41  0.72*
Note: ***, ** and * respectively denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Table A.2
Location patterns of other industries
Industry No. obs. NH NO NF MARK W DIS
Springs 11 3.57** 0.72 3.96***  0.11  4.08** 0.96
Plaster for construction 7 4.2** 0.99 2.74***  0.37 1.24  0.95
Jewellery 30 5.37*** 0.14 1.22*** 0.63*  3.23***  0.85
Transmission parts 17 2.83 2.16*** 1.72*** 0.12 2.79 0.07
Paste and glue 21 1.33 1.78*** 3.53***  0.95** 2.57*  1.48**
Soap 17 2.25** 0.47 2.63***  0.59 2.1  1.69*
Basic plastics 17 2.31*** 0.54 2.49*** 0.91 0.2  2.92***
Cardboards 11 2.43* 0.71 2.16***  0.42 1.38  0.75
Screws 7 2.33 1.33 1.46** 0.72  0.42  2.7*
Small metal articles 10 1.33 2.02* 1.68*  0.15  0.02  3.77***
Industrial gas 50 2.26** 0.5 2.22***  0.61  1.08 0.46
Curved glass 8 4.35*  2.42 2.92***  1.99**  5.54**  3.8**
Small gen., eng. and transf. 9 0.06 1.66 2.68***  2.06** 2.35  3.3**
Agricultural machinery 11 2.07 0.43 1.73*** 0.99  0.86 1.29
Cables and wires 20 2** 0.67 1.49*** 0.01  1.55  0.17
Car bodies 21 1.34 1.15* 1.29*** 0.45 0.95  0.18
Navigation equipment 26 1.49 1.27** 0.95**  0.34  0.7  1.19*
Dom. elec. appliances 13  0.17 1.8** 1.84***  0.82 3.4***  0.16
Mechanical handling eq. 27 0.94 1.12*** 1.18*** 0.35  0.21  0.49
Active electronic comp. 21  0.04 1.21** 2.02*** 0.77* 0.05 1.11
Tabs 27 1.24 0.46 1.1***  0.04 1.83 0.03
Misc elec. mat. 12 1.31 0.67 0.64 0.66 1.42 0.44
Locks 19 1.01 0.27 1.3*** 0.69*  1.6  1
Essential oils 26 0.03 1.08** 1.41*** 1.24***  1.13 0.26
Men’s apparel 10 0.91  0.46 2.05***  0.19  3.37*  1.86**
Metal treatment 29  0.06 1.29*** 1.24*** 0  1.05  1.26**
Mechanical tools 51 0.95 0.87*** 0.64** 0.13  0.33  0.16
Shoes 19 1.23 0.46 0.65*** 1.36***  1.44  1.09
Concrete for cons. 29 0.27 0.7* 1.36*** 0.53  0.01  1.42***
Food ind. machinery 51 0.66 0.01 1.65*** 0.25 0.7  1.31**
Batteries 22  0.94 0.93 2.26***  0.13 0.69  1.24
Perfume 49 0.42  0.59 2.41***  0.35 0.29  0.92
Tech. plastic parts 45 0.85 0.25 1.08*** 0.11 0.23  1.06**
Industrial chemicals 47  0.07 0.96*** 1.3***  0.1 2.2**  0.78
Construction machinery 31 1.36*  0.53 1.22*** 0.5 0.22  0.69
Office furniture 20 2.37**  0.73 0.33 1.25**  1.21  0.92
Transmission equipment 20 0.13 0.04 1.77*** 0.27 1.17 4.55***
Clothing accessories 28 0.3 0.07 1.56***  0.72 1.82  2.24***
Light metal packaging 14 0.2  0.38 2.09*** 1.06**  2.17  0.62
Glasses 12  0.13 0.57 1.43*** 0.27 3.23  0.6
Low tension elec. eq. 68 0.41 0.73** 0.73*** 0.49*  1.27  0.16
Pharmaceuticals 126 0.21 0.49** 1.12*** 0.09 0.03  0.46
Cement 15  0.35 0.85 1.27**  0.21 1.32  1.96***
Plastic for packaging 42 0.82 0.09 0.76*** 0.73***  0.86  0.75
Misc. organic chemicals 19  0.14 0.45 1.27*** 0.76*  0.4  1.19*
Pumps and compressors 49  0.89 1.09*** 1.34***  0.1 2.95*** 0.63
Telephones 32  0.48 0.63 1.4**  0.32 1.55  0.23
Scientific inst. 117  0.09 0.28 1.22***  0.13 0.99  0.85**
Ind. refrigerating mach. 71  0.49 0.49** 1.4***  0.4 0.69  0.46
Agri. use chem. 37  2.02 1.01** 2.27***  0.5 2.05*** 1.86**
M. Crozet et al. / Regional Science and Urban Economics 34 (2004) 27–5452
Industry No. obs. NH NO NF MARK W DIS
Springs 11 3.57** 0.72 3.96***  0.11  4.08** 0.96
Wood structure 8 1.36  0.05  0.07 1.88***  2.8  3.55***
Book publishing 321 0.57** 0.54*** 0.05 0.84***  1.3***  0.37
Plastic tubes 46  0.41  0.11 1.47*** 0.47*  0.64  0.6
Boilermaking 30 0.1 0.38 0.37 0.59 2.11  1.12**
Oil refining 184  0.51  0.01 1.23*** 0.5***  0.33 0.25
Hydraulic transmissions 40  0.87  0.19 1.78*** 0.27  0.86  0.32
Plastics for construction 60  0.76* 0.1 1.31*** 0.65***  1.36*  1.72***
Clocks 13  1.92** 0.14 2.38*** 0.99 0.94  2.74**
Passive electronic comp. 43  0.68  0.14 1.42*** 0.42 1.06  1.49
Other paper and
cardboard art. 35  1.69 0.8** 1.39***  0.17  0.81  0.68
Printing 37  0.38  0.31 1.12* 0.43 0.51  1.71***
Women’s apparel 251 0.34  0.26 0.24** 1.22***  1.02***  0.06
Paper and cardboard 17  0.53  1.1 1.68***  0.4 2.79**  1.85*
Misc. machinery 25 1.45  2.78 0.99** 0.54  0.88 0.14
General machinery 28  1.14 0.2 0.51 1.27**  1.99  1.67***
Silk manufacturing 13  2.32 0.42 0.92* 1.2***  2.75** 0.51
Newspaper publishing 25 0.26  0.3  1.39 5.77*** 2.84  0.08
Underwear 8 0.46  2.23  0.25 3.37***  3.95*  1.41
Magazine publishing 27  1.3 0.31  1.04 4.39 5.86**  1.45
Note: ***, ** and * respectively denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Table A.2 (continued)
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